This paper analyzes North Korean ports in light of existing models of port system evolution. It reviews the economic and political factors shaping port concentration in developed, developing, and socialist countries. A database on vessel movements allows for the analysis of individual North Korean port traffic by total capacity circulated, cargo type, fleet nationality, immediate origin and destination, and berthing time. While ideological factors and military control hamper port modernization and trade openness, traffic concentration at the Pyongyang-Nampo gateway highlights the spatial polarization in the capital region at the expense of Eastern ports for which inland transport limitations and industrial decline have become major issues. The North Korean case only partly fits general models because traffic concentration occurs due to geopolitical isolation and internal limitations rather than economic and trade growth.
Introduction
The fate of ports has long been associated with unpredictable circumstances (Jackson, 1983) . Throughout the world, the improvement of transport systems and the integration of ports within multimodal transport chains foster port concentration and competition (Slack, 1985; Hoare, 1986) . The literature depicts how ports adapt to change through different sets of local and national policies, strengthening their performance and their insertion in intermodal systems and value chains (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005; Jacobs and Hall, 2007) . While such trends seem to be valid for ports operating in relatively opened economies, it is not yet verified whether they apply to the constrained and autarchic economy that has become the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK; hereafter referred to as North Korea).
Comparing North Korea with other constrained economies would improve our understanding of the relation between port systems and regional change. Most studies of port systems, which focus mainly on developed nations due to more accessible information, have neglected social and political considerations explaining traffic change. Ports in relatively closed or lessdeveloped economies often receive little attention, because they are not performing well enough or are not sufficiently inserted in the networks of global players. This is regrettable because not only periods of growth but also periods of decline shall be analyzed in order to better understand the transport geography of spatial change.
In the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea was regarded as the most dynamic East Asian economy after Japan. However, it started to falter, declining from the 1980s onwards due to geopolitical change and economic mismanagement (Oh and Hassig, 1999) . The two major factors are the disappearance of the socialist block in 1991, with which North Korea handled most of its trade, and the death of president Kim Il-Sung in 1994, which led to a political crisis accentuated by natural disasters and famine. In the late 1990s, the regime implemented halshs-00458587, version 1 -21 Feb 2010 important economic reforms, introducing some elements of the market economy 1 . The new attitude of the current regime is closely associated with South Korea's efforts for economic cooperation, as seen in the two inter-Korean presidential summits of 2000 and 2007, and the relatively successful development of the Gaeseong and Geumgang special zones near the border . In addition, an industrial corridor is emerging between Pyongyang and Nampo, the capital's gateway, through joint ventures between local and foreign companies (Roussin and Ducruet, 2007) . However, there remains a debate among specialists on whether such reforms are paving the way towards a Chinese model or if they remain an accidental survival strategy (Yoon, 2006) .
North Korean ports are strategically located in Northeast Asia (Figure 1 ), notably regarding their potential for connecting the Europe-Asia land bridge in a context of regional economic growth and integration (Choi et al., 2003; Rozman, 2004) . However, North Korea remains a barrier rather than a bridge and most land-based shipments from Japan, China, and Korea preferably use either the Trans Siberian or Trans China railroads. The eight international trading ports are regularly distributed along the East and West coasts, in accordance with the configuration of the urban system ( Figure 2 ). The study of North Korean ports is worthwhile for realizing two main objectives: a) Confronting existing models of port system evolution to the case of a politically isolated and economically constrained country; b) Complementing the general knowledge on North Korean geography and economy by looking at how geopolitical change and regional dynamics are highlighted through the evolving traffic distribution.
1 Notably in the agricultural sector, price system, entrepreneurship, and foreign investment procedures.
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While available information about North Korea remains limited to partial political and economic data (Jo and Adler, 2002a) , we propose using a world database on vessel movements provided by Lloyd's Marine Intelligence Unit (LMIU), an independent organization which insures approximately 80% of the world fleet. Aggregating data on vessel capacities makes it possible to obtain a snapshot of the situation of North Korean ports along three main periods: growth and stagnation before the collapse of the USSR (1985-1991), geopolitical isolation (1992-1998) , economic reforms, inter-Korean cooperation, and foreign investments (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Such information is by far the most accurate source for studying constrained economies, because all other governmental organizations provide only rough estimates of North Korea's maritime trade (Ducruet and Jo, 2008) . North Korean ports are controlled by the army that does not provide any information on traffic and infrastructure.
Because a comprehensive study of North Korean ports and transport system is lacking, this research also synthesizes numerous and dispersed information from economic intelligence, governmental reports, and press releases published on this country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature on port systems in transport geography. Section 3 represents the core of the paper. It first introduces a brief historical background of North Korean ports, then explains the methodology, and goes through the analysis of port traffic distribution along the three main periods. Concluding remarks in section 4 discuss the lessons drawn from the case of the North Korean port system.
Port system evolution in transport geography

General trends
The analysis of port systems is an important part of transport and regional development studies (Hoyle, 1974) . Increased globalization has fostered a global halshs-00458587, version 1 -21 Feb 2010
transportation system that redesigns inter-port relationships on various geographical scales (Slack, 1993) .
The port system is a rather vague geographical concept. On the one hand, it corresponds to the port region or land area within which port activities substantially impact the economic structure (e.g. employment), but it is often confounded with the hinterland that reflects the market area in which inbound and outbound port-related transport flows take place. It is also understood as a group of ports situated in geographical proximity, such as the maritime façade, which is based on a single and continuous coastline, and the port range that is defined by interdependency among ports sharing multiple vessel calls. Finally, the port network represents the service coverage of a given carrier, regardless of the geographical proximity. Korea. The main differences between socialist and developing port systems involve land transport, traffic distribution, and traffic type (Table 2 ). In the former Soviet Union, the spatial division of port functions serving the continental hinterland centralized in Moscow formed a star-shaped railway network aimed at controlling access to the different seas (Thorez, 1998a) . Although socialist leaders often expressed their disregard for sea transport, maritime trade in socialist economies grew from 2% in 1939 to 9% in 1991 (Vigarié, 1995) , reflecting the extension of their influence to countries only accessible through sea transport (e.g. Cuba, Vietnam, and Africa). After the collapse of the USSR, ports located in newly independent countries (NICs) adapted to new hinterland patterns by diversifying traffic and modernizing infrastructure (Thorez, 1998b) . Maritime transport in socialist countries was long perceived as costly, of little use, and limited to coastal shipping. The new geopolitical context forced Russia to develop long-distance trades with remote trade partners such as Cuba (Vigarié, 1995) . In China, following the Open Door Policy (1978), port development occurred
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despite inland transport limitations with the development of special economic zones and open cities along the coast (Lo, 1989) .
Since the 1960s, literature on port systems has emphasized the impact of containerization on Asian colonial and post-colonial port cities (Basu, 1985; Murphey, 1989; Kidwai, 1989) . Technological changes in shipping and globalization processes caused port concentration and selection, questioning the notion that the amount of cargo handled by the port was strictly proportional to the economic weight of the surrounding region (Todd, 1993) .
The model proposed by Taaffe et al. (1963) shows the degradation and disappearance of minor ports due to the growth of gateway ports at the head of transport corridors, where agglomeration economies are intensified. The argument of Smolensky and Ratajczak (1965) about the shift of larger cities from centre to periphery is questioned by Stern and Hayuth (1984) , who observed that remotely located ports have limited local impact due to their dependence on inland core regions. Although port development relates to the existing urban structure of a given country, attempts to develop peripheral regions through port activities in developing countries have been rather limited (Fujita and Mori, 1996) . Spatial concentration of population, economic activity, and port traffic also appeared in socialist countries such as Cuba (Alfonso, 2001) .
Besides the aforementioned issues, port development in developing and socialist countries is dictated by wider mechanisms of state planning, resource allocation, and settlement structure. The relative absence of property rights, lack of international openness and human capital, limited infrastructure and manufactured inputs, small market size, and complex governance often result in a lack of incentives and innovation (Edwards, 1993; Tybout, 2000) . This is exactly the case in North Korea, where reliance on heavy industries and military control prevented the emergence of a competitive advantage in the world economy (Jo, 2000) . Limited foreign trade, protectionism, and capital stock resulted in small halshs-00458587, version 1 -21 Feb 2010 port capacity, outdated infrastructure, and inadequate cargo handling facilities (Ahn, 2001; Yoon and Babson, 2002; Ahn, 2003) . As seen in Table 3 , North Korean ports remain relatively small, poorly equipped, and specialized in the handling of bulky products, while limitations of nautical accessibility indicates wide gaps with global shipping standard requirements. As a result, most cargo is loaded and unloaded by hand using a large quantity of workforce at the docks (Ducruet and Roussin, 2007a) . This situation can be accentuated by bureaucratic obstacles and institutionalized corruption that is defined by favored military and power-holding elites having better access to information, foreign manufactured goods, travel opportunities, nepotism, and cronyism (Bermudez, 2006) . In Indonesia, cumbersome customs regulations once hampered the spread of containerization (Airriess, 1989) and still nowadays more than 80% of Indonesian trade is transshipped through Singapore due to low port capacity locally (Ghani, 2006) . Similarly, the national renovation policy of Vietnamese ports faces low technical standards and port capacity (Vinh, 2004) . In other cases such as Baltic ports, port reforms and increased private participation in port management allows a steady modernization (Brodin, 2003) . Whether such trends are reflected in a socialist developing country like North Korea is verified in the next sections.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Port concentration in North Korea
Background and research perspectives
Centrally located for economic, trade and cultural exchange amongst neighboring powers, the Korean peninsula has always been under pressure for geopolitical control, resulting in the reluctance of Korean elites opening the country (Roussin, 2008; Yoon, 2008) .
Following successive short periods of expansion and long periods of closure over centuries, (Ahn, 2003) , while the few improvements at ports resulted from Soviet, Chinese, and
Japanese support, such as the creation of Rajin port, storage facilities, and oil piers in the 1970s (Cotton, 1996) . Ocean Shipping Agency (KOSA) 2 that is based in Pyongyang is responsible for all shiprelated services, but there is no existing information about the country's port policy. By looking at the evolution of urban population of main North Korean cities, existing studies point at a major demographic concentration in Pyongyang and other western cities (Jo and Adler, 2002b) . This phenomenon of urban primacy, which is typical of developing countries, may constitute the very cause of the westward shift of port traffic. Because Nampo is the main port on the west coast and is well connected by road to the core economic region, it has become the country's main maritime gateway. 3.2 Soviet influence: the dominance of East coast ports (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) During the heyday of the North Korean economy, traffic is relatively balanced between East and West coasts of the country (Figure 4 ). Total traffic is slightly more concentrated in Nampo, but container traffic clearly indicates the dominance of the East coast.
2 The KOSA is notably responsible for permit delivery, cargo handling management, quay booking, surveying, ship repair and inspection, bunkering and crew salvation, as well as administrative documentation, customs, bills of lading, and receives complains in case of good damage during shipping or stevedoring. and supply, transportation, shipbuilding and repair, and production of railroad rolling stock.
In comparison, the west coast has a rather secondary role in the port system. Of course, as the gateway to Pyongyang, Nampo has the biggest traffic volume, and a diversified portfolio in terms of traffic origin and destination. It has a higher proportion of bulk traffic to cover the needs of Pyongyang for construction materials (e.g. cement), but this is also the case for ports located nearby large cities (e.g. Heungnam, Cheongjin). Although the problem of low equipment is already widespread in North Korea during this period, Nampo is permanently constrained by the West Sea Barrage, completed in 1986, through which vessels larger than 50,000 deadweight tons cannot pass. West coast ports, but also Wonsan, also have
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the particularity to suffer more than other ports from political instabilities, due to their location near the inter-Korean border area. Their higher share of North Korean vessels may illustrate the tension between North Korea and South Korea, resulting in the limited permission given to foreign vessels accessing those ports. Indeed, Nampo has developed as a key military and industrial complex whose proximity with the capital city makes very strategic. Overall, both façades show relatively high average berthing periods, except for Wonsan due to the regular ferry link with Niigata, Japan.
Isolation: the shift to the West (1992-1998)
The second period ( Figure 5 ) shows a major concentration of traffic at Nampo. East coast ports have greatly declined. The loss of socialist trades undoubtedly harmed the relations between eastern ports and former Soviet ports. Heungnam has most declined probably due to heavier dependence on Soviet trades. Local factors also explain this trend, as in the case of Wonsan, from which numerous factories were moved in the mid-1990s so as to create a new and secured military and industrial complex in the mountainous northern areas.
As a result, Wonsan's total traffic and share of tanker traffic have both greatly reduced. The deterioration of roads and obstruction of tunnels also started to impact negatively on the dynamism of Wonsan that is increasingly isolated from the capital region (Roussin and Ducruet, 2006) . In fact, the country is isolated geopolitically, while internal areas have become less connected internally (Ducruet and Roussin, 2007b) .
The decline of the East coast is counterbalanced by some exceptions. For instance, the special economic zone of Rajin-Seonbong was opened in 1991 as part of the larger United Nations Tumen River Development Programme, resulting in a higher traffic growth than other ports. A recent study concluded that such increase was due to the construction of the project rather than to its operation (Jo and Ducruet, 2007) , as seen in the large share of bulk products.
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The study also demonstrated that the absence of a manufacturing base would be a better explanation of the limited success than geographical remoteness and political tensions. Thus, increased trade flows were mostly explained by land-based traffic with neighboring Chinese provinces. From the mid-1990s, China started improving Rajin's road connections while building new container facilities for improving its access to the Pacific (Cotton, 1996) .
Notably, Rajin provides Japan with direct maritime connection to the Trans-Siberia-Railroad (TSR) and Trans-China-Railroad (TCR). Rajin, Cheongjin, and Wonsan keep the highest share of regular shipping (that is also high in Heungnam), the first due to their inland connections with China, while Wonsan maintains its regular ferry service with Niigata, avoiding too much decline.
Comparatively, the traffic structure of western ports has not much changed since the previous period. General cargo remains dominant in general, while bulk traffic is more needed at larger urban and industrial agglomerations. The specificity of Nampo is to have kept a wide diversity of maritime connections, while other ports are becoming dominantly connected with Japan. Isolation and geopolitical change provoked a retreat of North Korea from the international scene, resulting in more short-sea and less long-distance connections, except for Nampo, the gateway to Pyongyang. Paradoxically, the share of North Korean vessels remained higher for southern ports due to prolonged political tensions, but it has slightly reduced in Haeju. Also, the general increase of average berthing time that also reflects North indicates that the army maintains its control on vessel selection at strategically located ports.
The share of North Korean vessels increased in Cheongjin, but this is better explained by its general decline as it was recently qualified as a dormant port (Pons, 2006) . Rajin also showed a retreat of foreign vessels and an increase of berthing time. The general reduction of long distance connections (i.e. outside Northeast Asia) marks the continued decline of the country, while it remains important for Cheongjin and Heungnam only due to humanitarian aid from developed countries.
Beside changes in trade patterns and geopolitics, one major restrictive factor affecting East coast ports is the deterioration of the domestic land transport system. The road network is only 7% paved nowadays; most highways are concentrated in the west around the capital region, where 20% of the operating factories are located (Bang, 2004) . This is confirmed by the distribution of domestic inland traffic: 30% in the South Pyongan province, 10% in the North Pyongan province, 24% in the North Hamgyeong province, and 17% in the South
Hamgyeong province (Tsuji, 2005) . The lack of inland connectivity between the different provinces also reflects military concerns: the army keeps a firm control on interurban movements and plans the road network for defense rather than economic purposes (Roussin and Ducruet, 2006) . Therefore, railways remain the only transportation mode capable of carrying the goods generated by mines, and of reaching remote, mountainous areas (Tsuji, 2004) . The limited internal connectivity has gradually resulted in the concentration of traffic at Nampo, Pyongyang's main (and only) maritime gateway, between which the 10-lane Youth
Hero motorway was built in 2000. Overall, this concentration results from the complex intervention of physical, economical, and political factors on various scales, from the local to the global.
Conclusion
The analysis of traffic distribution within the North Korean port system is fruitful in many ways. It has overcome the scarcity of data that often characterizes constrained and closed economies. Although measuring traffic in deadweight tonnage or slot capacities cannot account for the real volumes handled at the docks, the excessive costs that characterize shipping to and from North Korean ports provide a sufficient argument in favor of considering those shipments as an indicator of the level and nature of port activities.
This study complements our understanding of port system concentration in general (see Table 4 for a synthesis). The classic process of economic polarization of the core region in developing countries is verified in North Korea by the concentration of traffic at one main load centre, Nampo. North Korean authorities failed to sustain the principle of regional balance that was based on the polycentric urban system. Before the isolation, the transport system could provide the capital region with a good access to East and West coasts. Thus, traffic shift and concentration in North Korea resulted from the impact of geopolitical crisis rather than from the spatial agglomeration of economic activities.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Internal political crisis and natural disasters contributed to the dereliction of the transport system, resulting in disconnection amongst North Korean provinces. As a result, the core region has become increasingly isolated. Only Nampo and other Western cities located 
